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This article brings to bear new data on the issue of structuring national innovation systems.
Drawing on a unique data set of prize winning innovations between 1971 and 2006, we
document three key changes in the U.S. economy. The first is an expanding role of inter-
organizational collaborations in producing award winning innovations. The second is the
diminishing role of the largest corporations as sources of innovation. The third is the
expanded role of public institutions and public funding in the innovation process. This leads
us to the surprising conclusion that the U.S. increasingly resembles a Developmental Net-
work State in which government initiatives are critical in overcoming network failures and
in providing critical funding for the innovation process. The paper concludes by addressing
the implications of these finding for debates over the appropriate regime for intellectual
property rights. 
1. Introduction
There is growing international recognition that nations that develop more
effective national systems of innovation will have a significant advantage in
the  global  economy.  And  that  recognition,  in  turn,  has  led  to  intense
debates over which rules for governing intellectual property are most con-
sistent with a strong innovation system. The problem, however, is that
most of the empirical work on this question has focused on the analysis of
data on patenting rates across countries and by different types of firms.
But patent rates are a problematic proxy for effective innovation, and there
is a danger that reliance on this proxy is producing a distorted understand-
ing of the circumstances under which innovation occurs and the intellectu-
al property regimes that might best facilitate such innovation.
This paper brings a quite different data source to bear on understanding
changes in the U.S. innovation system over the last four decades. The data
set is a sample of key innovations in the U.S. economy drawn from an
annual  awards  competition  for  innovative  products  organized  by  R&D
Magazine between 1971 and 2006. By looking not at patent data but at
actual new products that are admired by prize juries, we hope to illuminate
the changing sources of innovation in the U.S. economy.
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2. Reviewing the Literature
In The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, the late sociologist Daniel Bell pro-
vided the most systematic elaboration of the postindustrial concept. In his
analysis, postindustrial change is driven by the systematic harnessing by
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1 For another analysis of this data source, see Roberto Fontana, Alessandro Nuvolari, Hiroshi Shim-
itzu, and Andrea Vezzulli, “Schumpeterian Patterns of Innovation and the Sources of Breakthrough
Inventions:  Evidence from a Data-Set of R&D Awards,” unpublished paper, October 2010.both business and government of science and technology to expand and
continuously update the production of goods and services. For Bell, the rise
of the computer industry in the fifties and sixties with its armies of skilled
technologists was a paradigmatic case of this broader process of transfor-
mation. Bell anticipated that the growing dependence of business on scien-
tists, engineers, and technicians would necessitate larger shifts in business
organization and in the role of government.   
Bell also anticipated that scientists and engineers would transform both
products and processes across the full range of industries in much the same
way that industrial technologies diffused across all sectors of the economy
over the Nineteenth Century. Craft knowledge and traditional production
techniques would give way to sophisticated science-based approaches that
enhanced efficiency and created a cornucopia of new goods and services.
“This new fusion of science with innovation, and the possibility of system-
atic and organized technological growth, is one of the underpinnings of the
post-industrial society” (Bell 1973, p. 197).  
Bell’s foresaw significant changes in the corporation as scientists, engineers
and other members of a “new intelligentsia” rose in importance.  
“If the dominant figures of the past hundred years have been the 
entrepreneur, the businessman, and the industrial executive, the
‘new men’ are the scientists, the mathematicians, the economists, 
and the engineers of the new intellectual technology.” (344)
The argument pointed both to the growing role that technical experts would
play in top management positions and to structural changes in the organi-
zation of firms. While Bell did not address the issue explicitly, his argument
paralleled those of Burns and Stalker (1961) and Bennis and Slater (1968),
who argued that the growing centrality of technological expertise would
push organizations to be both less authoritarian and less hierarchical, mov-
ing from steeper to flatter organizations with greater emphasis on coordi-
nation by multi-disciplinary teams.  
Bell was even bolder in arguing that postindustrial change would transform
the relationship between business and government. On the one side, govern-
ment’s dominant role in financing scientific and technological research great-
ly enhanced its role in the economy. On the other, Bell argued that corpora-
tions would have to move beyond narrow profit-maximizing strategies if they
were to take full advantage of the new technological possibilities.  Hence, he
foresaw a new balance of power between business and government:
“It seems clear to me that, today, we in America are moving away
from  a  society  based  on  a  private-enterprise  market  system
toward one in which the most important economic decisions will 
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be  made  at  the  political  level,  in  terms  of  consciously  defined 
‘goals’ and ‘priorities’.” (Bell 1973, pp. 297-298)
Although Bell’s framework is now infrequently referenced (see, however,
Block 1990, Brick 2006)), several currents of research have followed up on
these arguments. A growing body of scholarly work over the last two
decades focuses on “national systems of innovation” to track how differ-
ent societies organize the complex task of linking scientific research with
product  and  process  innovations  (Collins  2004;  Lundvall  1992;  Nelson
1993). This literature rests on the idea that innovation capacity is centrally
important as nations seek to gain advantage in the world economy.
Many  of  these  studies  of  innovation  systems  focus  on  the  interface
between the public and private sector, looking particularly at public funding
of research and higher education, the growth of the scientific and technical
labor force, the systems for establishing and protecting intellectual proper-
ty rights for innovators, and the mechanisms that facilitate the movement
of ideas from the research lab to the market. The great strength of this lit-
erature is that it looks simultaneously at the role of government and the role
of business and raises important questions about the interaction between
the  two.  Nevertheless,  this  work  has  identified  an  important  focus  of
inquiry, but it has not yet identified systematic and causally significant vari-
ations in the organization of innovation systems across nations.   
A second relevant body of work consists of studies that analyze the shift
of  business  firms,  particularly  in  the  United  States,  towards  networked
forms of organization. This shift represents a reversal of a pattern of cor-
porate development that started in the last years of the 19
th century. Back
then, successful U.S. firms aspired to a high level of vertical integration
which meant controlling many different stages of the production process
under one corporate roof (Fligstein 1990). Some of these firms attained
high levels of self-sufficiency, often financing their growth with retained
profits and drawing much of their technology from their own research lab-
oratories. However, with gathering speed over the last half century, there
has been a significant shift in the dominant business model away from ver-
tical integration (Castells 1996; Powell 2001).
Many firms have shifted key parts of the production process to supplier firms.
The trend is exemplified both by Nike, which has outsourced the production
of its athletic shoes, and the increased reliance of Detroit automakers on sub-
contractors to produce many key parts of their automobiles (Whitford 2005).
But the pattern also extends to the research and development function where
many firms are less reliant on their own laboratories and more involved in
complex webs of collaboration with other firms, universities, and government
laboratories (Hounshell 1996; Mowery 2009; Powell 2001). Implicit in much of the literature on networked firms is the idea that there
will be much more fluidity than in a world of vertically integrated firms. New
firms will continue to form as a result of spinoffs from existing firms and
from  university  and  government  laboratories.  Moreover,  some  of  these
newcomers will be able to exploit their initial role as subcontractors to
establish  superiority  in  important  new  technologies  in  the  way  that
Microsoft gained strategic control over the operating system for IBM’s per-
sonal computers. Similarly, large established firms are at risk of precipitous
decline if they fail to remain at the frontier of innovation. This gives us our
first research question:  over the last four decades, has there been a decline
in the role of the largest firms as developers of innovative new technolo-
gies, or have the largest firms continued to serve as the central nodes of
innovation networks?
The rise of a networked industrial structure is particularly obvious in the com-
puter industry and in biotechnology (Powell, White, Koput and Owen-Smith
2005; Saxenian 1994). In both industries, small and large firms are involved
in elaborate collaborative networks, and it is widely recognized that innova-
tion grows out of processes of cooperation that cross organizational lines. But
research to date has been unclear as to whether this pattern of inter-organi-
zational collaboration is characteristic of the entire economy or confined to the
most  technologically  dynamic  sectors.  Our  second  research  question  is
whether or not the shift towards inter-organizational collaboration in the inno-
vation process has been a general trend across the entire economy.
A final body of literature has documented the emergence of a triple helix of
intertwined efforts by government, universities, and corporations to produce
more rapid innovation. Extending Bell’s analysis, this body of work shows
how tightly university-based science efforts are now linked to industry, but
it also shows that government agencies are playing an increasingly central
role in managing and facilitating the process of technological development
(Block 2008; Etzkowitz 2003; Geiger and Sa 2008; Kenney 1986). In cases
such as the Human Genome Project, organized by NIH and the Department
of Energy, and the Strategic Computing Initiative organized by DARPA, gov-
ernment officials have played a central role in both setting technological
goals and providing the funding to facilitate joint efforts by university-based
researchers and business (Kevles 1992; McCray 2009;  Roland 2002).
These targeted government programs have been combined with a highly
decentralized system for encouraging innovation. Starting in the 1980’s, new
incentives were created for publicly funded researchers at universities and
government laboratories to pursue commercial applications of their discover-
ies. Such efforts have been supported by funding programs, such as the Small
Business  Innovation  Research  (SBIR)  program  through  which  government
agencies set aside a small percentage of their R&D budgets for projects pro-
5posed by small firms, many of which are newly created spinoffs from univer-
sity or federal laboratories (Wessner 2008). Other programs have been creat-
ed to encourage joint ventures between researchers in university and federal
laboratories and business firms (Block 2008; Geiger and Sa 2008). This pro-
vides us with our third research question: has there been a marked increase
in the public sector’s role in funding and facilitating innovation efforts?  
Exploring each of these questions requires finding some way to measure
innovative activities. However, the measurement of innovation has been a
longstanding problem for social scientists. It is not adequate to count the
dollars spent on research and development or the number of scientists and
technologists  at  work  since  these  are  simply  inputs  to  the  innovation
process. Many studies have used patent statistics as a proxy, but these are
a problematic indicator because the rate of successful patenting does not
necessarily track changes in useful innovations.
The quality of patents can vary significantly over time as a consequence of
shifts in policy that govern patent offices and changes in the incentives of
different economic actors (Sciberras 1986, Taylor 2004). For example, one
study showed that many universities in the U.S. significantly increased the
quantity of their patent filings in the aftermath of the Bayh-Dole legislation.
However, the quality of the resulting patents, as reflected in subsequent
citations, also fell substantially (Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedonis
2001; Thursby and Thursby 2002). Similarly, there has been an increase in
“strategic patenting” by corporations and other actors in recent years. 
Strategic patenting refers to the acquisition of a patent without any serious
interest in developing products that use the patent. An individual or firm
that acquires a portfolio of such strategic patents can sometimes make a
significant return by suing other firms for infringement of those patents.
There is some debate about the size of the problem posed by these “patent
trolls”, but the phenomenon has received a lot of attention. Probably the
more serious problem is that large corporations have been aggressive in
acquiring substantial portfolios of strategic patents as a defensive maneu-
ver. If they are sued by another firm for infringing an existing patent, they
might use some of the patents in their portfolio to mount a countersuit
against the other firm. If the suits have somewhat similar levels of plausi-
bility, the chances of negotiating a settlement increase significantly.      
In short, an increase over time in the amount of strategic patenting could
easily alter the relationship between patents and actual usable new prod-
ucts or processes. For this reason, we use a data set of award winning
innovations to illuminate structural shifts in the U.S. economy that have
occurred over the last four decades. This data set shows much more sub-
stantial changes over time than those revealed in patenting data.
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3. Introducing the Data
For more than forty years, R&D Magazine has annually recognized 100 inno-
vations  that  are  incorporated  into  actual  commercial  products.  These
awards are comparable to the Oscars for the motion picture industry; they
carry considerable prestige within the community of research and develop-
ment professionals. Organizations nominate their own innovations and a
changing jury that includes representatives from business, government, and
universities, in collaboration with the magazine’s editors, decide upon the
final list of awards (the nomination and selection procedures are described
on the magazine’s website at http://www.rdmag.com/100win.html). The
awards go to commercial products that were introduced into the market-
place during the previous year. The entry forms require evidence of the avail-
ability of the product and its price. With 100 innovations that can be rec-
ognized, juries are able to recognize the full diversity of innovative products,
not just to focus on dynamic sectors such as electronics or biotechnology.
We coded all of the winning innovations for three randomly chosen years in
each of the last four decades to identify the types of organizations that
were responsible for nurturing the award winners. [Full data is provided in
Appendix 1] Since 1971, somewhere between five and thirteen of the
awards each year went to foreign firms that had no U.S. partners.
2 We
excluded those cases and focused our analysis on the roughly ninety award
winners each year that involved U.S.-based firms.  
While the awards recognize innovations in a wide range of different indus-
tries, there are some biases in the process. The awards are tilted towards
product  innovations  rather  than  process  innovations—those  that  are
designed to raise the efficiency of the production process for goods and
services. Some process innovations, such as a new type of machine tool or
a more advanced computer program for managing inventories, are recog-
nized, but many important process innovations are not considered because
they involve complex combinations of new equipment and new organiza-
tional practices. Many military innovations are also excluded, since cutting
edge weapons are usually shrouded in secrecy and unavailable for pur-
chase. Since the great bulk of federal R&D dollars are still directed towards
weapons systems, many government funded innovations lie outside of this
competition.
Furthermore, the awards are structured to recognize just the tip of the
proverbial iceberg—the last steps in the innovation process. The many ear-
2 The only exceptions occur when a foreign firm owns a large, established U.S. business, such as
when Chrysler was owned by Daimler Benz. In such cases, we code the firm as a Fortune 500 firm.  lier steps are submerged and out of sight. This bias means that the awards
understate the role of university-based research since detailed case studies
suggest that many key innovations can be traced back to scientific break-
throughs in university laboratories (Roessner et. al. 1997).  
What other biases might enter the awards process? Questionable decisions
and politics will always be a factor as jury members seek to reward friends
and deny recognition to enemies. But for our purposes, it is not necessary
that these awards recognize the very best innovations of any particular
year. All that is necessary is that the awardees represent a reasonable cross
section of innovative products and that there is not a consistent bias that
favors awardees of a particular type.  
Different  resources  that  organizations  have  to  prepare  their  nomination
materials are another potential source of bias in competitions. Big architec-
tural firms, for example, can hire the best photographers and devote con-
siderable resources to a nomination while the hard-pressed solo practition-
er might throw the application form together in a few hours (Larson 1993,
1994). There is probably a similar bias in these awards with larger organi-
zations having more expertise at putting together persuasive nomination
packets. 
However, there are reasons to think that the magnitude of this bias would
be limited. For one thing, the universe of applicants is limited to organiza-
tions that have actually developed a commercial product, and since winning
the award is a powerful form of advertising, even the tiniest firms have
strong incentives to devote resources to an effective application. For anoth-
er, the quality of “coolness” that engineers and technologists admire in a
product is substantially easier to convey in words than the more abstract,
aesthetic qualities that architectural or film juries might be rewarding. Final-
ly, over the years there are many one-time winners, which reinforces the
impression that it is the quality of the product and not the quality of the
nomination packet that wins awards.
There are, however, two distinct biases in the awards that are important for
interpreting our results. First, it is very rare for the R&D 100 awards to rec-
ognize new pharmaceutical  products.  While  there  are  many  awards  for
medical devices and equipment, there seems to be a deliberate decision to
avoid medications of all kinds. Our assumption is that this reflects an abun-
dance of caution by the magazine, which does not want the bad publicity
or legal liability of recognizing a product that might later be found to have
negative side effects.
A second exclusion is more surprising. There are few awards over the last
twenty years for products—either hardware or software—developed by the
8largest computer firms.  Apple did not win an award for the iPod, Microsoft
has received only one R&D award since it began, and firms such as Intel,
Sun Microsystems, and Cisco have each won only once.  Many of the prod-
ucts of this industry represent incremental improvements such as new ver-
sions of software packages or slightly improved notebook computers and it
is logical that the jurors ignore these. But it also seems likely that even
when they produce a more dramatic innovation, jurors hold them to higher
standards than those used for other organizations.  
While these two exclusions indicate the need for caution in interpreting the
results, they are analytically fortuitous. Since the data largely leave out big
firms in the two industries—biotechnology and computing—that are gener-
ally seen as paradigmatic examples of science-based production, strong net-
work ties among firms, and substantial governmental involvement in the
innovation process, the awards data allows us to take a broader view of the
innovation economy. To what degree are the same trends effecting sectors
that have not been as strongly associated with science-based production?
3.1 Coding
It would be ideal to code both the organizational auspices and the funding
sources for every innovation awarded in the twelve competitions that we
analyze. But while the organizational auspices can be established with a rea-
sonable amount of research, uncovering the funding sources for almost
1200 different innovations is an almost impossible task. The primary diffi-
culty is that tracking flows of federal support to businesses is laborious and
complicated. In our data, we coded the organizational auspices as com-
pletely as possible for the roughly 1200 innovations. Our approach to estab-
lishing the funding sources of the recognized innovations represents a com-
promise. We performed a detailed analysis of federal funding to award-win-
ning firms and innovations for the years 1975 and 2006 to maximize the
contrast across time.
In organizational terms, the data revealed seven distinct loci from which the
award-winning innovations originated. They are:
Private
1. Fortune 500 firms operating alone.  
2. Other firms operating on their own; this is a residual category that
includes small and medium sized firms.
3. Collaborations among two or more private firms with no listed
93 We list any innovation as public as long as there is a collaborator that is public or a supported spin-
off.  We avoid double counting by listing collaborative winners under just one of these categories. If
a government laboratory is a participant in a collaboration, the innovation is attributed to the labo-
ratory regardless of other participants. If no government lab is involved, but there is a university, then
the innovation is attributed to the university. If there is another public or nonprofit participant, the
innovation is attributed to that participant. If there are multiple private participants, then it is coded
in category 3—private collaboration. Table 1 in the Appendix provides sufficient detail to show that
this particular coding scheme does not bias our results.
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4. Supported spin-offs. These are recently established (less than 10
years from founding) firms started by technologists at universities or
government labs who have been supported by federal research funds.
5. Government laboratories—working by themselves or in collabo-
ration. Most of these innovations come from the federal labora-
tories run by the Department of Energy, but some come from NIH,
military laboratories, and labs run by other agencies. If a univer-
sity is a partner in one of these collaborations with a laboratory, it 
will be reported here and not under university.
6. Universities—working by themselves or in collaboration with enti-
ties other than federal labs.
7. Other public sector and non profit agencies—working by them-
selves or in collaboration with private firms. 
4. Analyzing the Data
The R&D awards data provide powerful evidence on all three research ques-
tions.  We start with the second question—whether the shift towards col-
laboration has become a general trend. Analysts of the networked firm have
argued that innovation increasingly results from collaborations between two
or more organizations (Hargadon 2003; Lester and Piore 2004). The con-
nections between knowledge embodied in one organization and the knowl-
edge embodied in other organizations are critical for the innovation process.
The sparks generated when these different approaches are combined facil-
itate the discovery of effective new approaches (Hargadon 2003). Our data
provide support for this claim. Figure 1 shows a dramatic rise in the num-
ber of domestic award-winning innovations that involve inter-organizational
collaborations. The number of innovations attributed to a single private sec-
tor firm operating alone averaged 67 in the 1970’s, but that has dropped
to an average of only 27 in the current decade. 11
In part this shift reflects the growing importance of public sector agencies
as award winners, since we code all public agencies as engaging in collab-
oration since they invariably employ private partners to market their inno-
vative products. But it is also the case that even among the dwindling num-
ber of private sector winners, the frequency of formal collaborations rose
from 7.8% in the 1970’s to 17.5% in the current decade. 
An equally striking finding addresses the first research question—the role of
large corporations in the innovation process. Figure 2 shows the dramatic
decline in both solo and collaborative winners from the Fortune 500 firms.
While these firms were the largest single winner of awards in the 1970’s,
by the current decade, solo winners from the Fortune 500 could be count-
ed on the fingers of one hand. Even with collaborators, they averaged only
ten awards per year. 4 We are grateful to Donald Light for bringing these awards to our attention.
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To be sure, this is the place where the almost total exclusion of large comput-
er industry firms and pharmaceutical firms impacts the data. Data on U.S.
patent applications shows that firms such as IBM, Microsoft, Intel, and Sun rank
among the most prolific U.S. firms in the number of patents received (U.S.
Patent  and  Trademark  Office:  http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/
oeip/taf/reports.htm). They also represent important exceptions to the tenden-
cy for big firms to reduce their outlays for R&D over the past twenty years. So
the fact that their R&D effort is only rarely recognized in the R&D 100 means
that Figure 2 overstates the declining innovative capacity of Fortune 500 firms.
But even if the large computer industry firms were collectively receiving ten of
these awards per year, Figure 2 would still show a significant downward trend.
The situation with pharmaceutical firms is more complicated. While the
established large firms such as Merck and Pfizer and the most successful
of the biotech firms such as Genentech and Amgen continue to fund sig-
nificant research efforts, the number of innovative drugs they bring to the
market in recent years has been quite limited. The drug industry has its own
awards for innovation published by Prescrire International.
4 Their highest13
award, the golden pill, recognizes new drugs that represent a major break-
through. But between 1997 and 2006, only two drugs received this recog-
nition and there were only twelve others that received second place recog-
nition as a clear advance over existing therapies. This suggests that if the
R&D 100 competition had recognized prescription drugs, the results in Fig-
ure 2 would not have changed much at all.
The real significance of Figure 2 is the decline in awards won by general
purpose manufacturing firms such as General Electric, General Motors, and
3M. Firms like these dominated the awards in the 1970’s, but they only
rarely win in recent years. This decline parallels the trend in their patenting
activity, strongly suggesting diminished innovative efforts. Figure 3 shows
a dramatic decline in the percentage of U.S. corporate patents won by nine
of these manufacturing firms that have been in continuous existence and
are outside the computer industry.  5 “Number of full-time-equivalent (FTE) R&D scientists and engineers in R&D-performing companies,
by  industry  and  by  size  of  company”  is  available  at  http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/iris/search_
hist.cfm?indx=24 and http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf07314/pdf/tab41.pdf. These figures should
be taken as approximations due to changes in NSF’s procedures for collecting and estimating this
data over time. Data on Ph.D employees are provided in figure 3.18 in Science and Engineering Indi-
cators, 2008 at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind08/figures.htm.
6 In the cases that we have coded as solo, the innovation award went solely to a federal lab or a
university. This presumably indicates that the partner enlisted to commercialize the product had no
ownership of the intellectual property involved in the innovation.
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These declines can be traced to the priorities of corporate executives faced
with continuing pressure over the last several decades to improve the quarter-
ly financial results of their firms. Many firms have cut back their R&D efforts
or shifted funds towards product development. After all, research is expensive
and its contribution to the bottom line is likely to come long after the current
CEO’s tenure in office. At the same time, the financial orientation of top exec-
utives means that they see new technologies as simply another asset that can
be acquired rather than produced internally. They are confident that when the
time comes, they can either license the technologies they need or buy up the
firms that are producing innovations (Estrin 2009; Tassey 2007).   
The magnitude of this shift is indicated by employment trends among sci-
entists and engineers working for private firms. According to data collect-
ed by the NSF, in 1971 7.6% percent of R&D scientists and engineers
working for industry, or 28,200 individuals, were employed by firms with
fewer than 1,000 employees. By 2004, this percentage had risen to 32%,
while the actual number of people had grown to 365,000. NSF data also
indicate that Ph.D. scientists and engineers have become even more con-
centrated in small firms; in 2003, 24% of those working for industry were
employed at firms with fewer than ten employees and more than half were
at firms with under 500 employees.
5 It is, of course, impossible to know
how much of this shift reflected push factors that led technologists to leave
large firms and how much was the attraction of working in smaller firms.
Either way, the trend in the awards away from big firms follows the trend
of the technologists who create the innovations.
As the role of large corporations declined, there has been a corresponding gain
in awards for public and mixed entities. This provides answers to the third
research question—whether the public sector is playing an expanding role in
the innovation system. As Figure 4 shows, the majority of awards are now
won by either federal laboratories, universities, or the firms that we have cat-
egorized as supported spinoffs. In the last two decades, the federal laborato-
ries have become the dominant organizational locus for wining these awards.
They now have about the same weight in the overall awards as the Fortune
500 firms did in the 1970’s–averaging about 35 awards per year.
6 This is a
surprising finding because many observers hold the federal laboratories in low7 Even in the scholarly literature, it is rare to find recognition of the innovation productivity of the
labs. For an overview of the labs, see Crow and Bozeman 1998. One of the rare sources that rec-
ognizes the increased commercial productivity of the labs is Jaffe and Lerner 2001.
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esteem and doubt their capacity to contribute to innovation. Most of the win-
ning innovations originate in the Department of Energy laboratories that were
initially created to develop atomic weapons in the early years of the Cold War.
The sinister image of Ph.D. physicists and chemists working assiduously to
develop  ever  more  destructive  weaponry  has  certainly  colored  the  public
image of these facilities.
7 
After the Federal laboratories, the next most important public or mixed enti-
ty  are  the  supported  spin-offs.  These  entities—on  their  own—averaged
close to eight awards per year in the current decade and they also win some
additional awards in partnership with government laboratories or universi-
ties. Moreover, as we will see later, firms that began as supported spin-offs
but have been in existence for more than ten years are coded as “other
firms”—part of the private category—and their weight in the awards has
also increased over time.  8 Even if we recode collaborations that involve both a federal lab and a university as “university,”
the number of award-winning innovations involving federal labs still substantially outweighs those
involving universities. 
9 The NIH has applied for and received a waiver which enables it to exceed these caps.
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The typical pattern of a supported spin-off is that a professor or a scientist
at a university or federal laboratory makes an important discovery and con-
sults with university or lab officials as to how best to protect the resulting
intellectual property. In many cases, the organization encourages the inno-
vator to start his or her own firm to develop and ultimately market the new
product.  The  more  entrepreneurial  universities  and  laboratories  function
almost as venture capitalists by helping the individual find investors and
experienced managers who could guide the firm (Geiger and Sa 2008).
The final category in Figure 4 encompasses awards won by universities and
other public sector agencies and nonprofit firms. Surprisingly, the direct
weight of universities among award winners is relatively modest. There are
several reasons for this. First, some innovations that originate in university
laboratories  show  up  in  the  supported  spinoffs  category  because  the
researcher started his or her own firm. Second, university-based researchers
are increasingly part of collaborations with federal laboratories and our cod-
ing system attributes those innovations to the labs. In 2006, for example,
universities received two awards in partnership with other firms and seven
in partnership with federal laboratories. In short, even though the impor-
tance of scientific discoveries at universities has become ever more central
to the innovation process, most of the transition into commercial products
is mediated through spinoffs and the activities at federal laboratories.
8
Yet  a  focus  on  organizational  auspices  alone  does  not  capture  the  full
extent of U.S. government financing of the innovation process. Figure 5
shows the role of one of the most important—but little known—federal pro-
grams: the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. Firms that
had previously received one or more SBIR awards represent a very large
share of winners in the current decade. SBIR is a set aside program which
requires that federal agencies with large research budgets devote 2.5% of
their R&D budgets to support firms with 500 employees or less. It is also a
program that provided initial funding for many of the supported spinoffs.
The program awards up to $100,000 in no strings support for projects in
Phase I and up to $750,000 for Phase II projects that have shown signifi-
cant progress in meeting the initial objectives.
9 In 2004, the SBIR project
gave  out  more  than  $2  billion  for  some  sixty-three  hundred  separate
research projects. As the figure shows, current and past SBIR award win-
ners have come to constitute roughly 25% of domestic winners each year.17
In Figure 6, we try to provide a more comprehensive measure of the role of
federal financing over time by looking in greater detail at funding for award
winners in 1975 and 2006. The bottom part of each graph shows the var-
ious public sector winners that rely heavily on federal funding. As indicated
earlier, this shows a dramatic rise from 14 to 61 of the awardees. But the
top part of the graph shows the number of “other” and Fortune 500 firms
that received at least 1% of their revenues from the federal government.
10
This 1% screen picks up both large defense contractors as well as firms that
have received substantial federal grants to support their R&D efforts. In 1975,
there were 23 awards won by private firms who received at least 1% of their
revenues from federal support. Prominent among these was General Electric
10 The logic of using a 1% of revenue screen is that it is common among large firms to devote only
3 to 4% of revenues to R&D expenditures. Hence federal awards or contracts of that magnitude
could help fund a significant increase in R&D effort.Figure 6: Winners Receiving Federal Dollars
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which in that year was responsible for nine award winning innovations.
11
In 2006, we found that of five private collaborations, the federal govern-
ment directly funded three. Of the 20 “other firms” that won awards, 13
had federal support above the 1% threshold and we were able to link the
federal money directly to the specific innovation that received the award.
Hence, sixteen of these “private” innovations count as federally funded.
The overall result in Figure 6 is that the number of federally funded innova-
tions rises from 36 in 1975 to 77 in 2006.
In 2006, literally only eleven of the domestic award winners were not bene-
ficiaries of federal funding. Two winning firms—Brion Tech and MMR Tech-
nologies—were recent spinoffs from Stanford University, but they had not
received  federal  funding  after  their  launch.  In  short,  Figure  6  probably
understates the magnitude of the expansion in federal funding for innova-
tions between 1975 and 2006. After all, in 1975, we count innovations as
federally funded even if support was not going to the specific unit of the
firm that was working on a particular innovation. For 2006, however, a
demonstration of federal support required showing that the federal funds
were going to the same unit that was responsible for the particular tech-
nology that won the award.
11 There were five additional awards that went to Fortune 500 companies that had contracts to
manage government laboratories in 1975 – two each for Union Carbide and DuPont and one for
Monsanto.19
Even in the period that Fortune 500 corporations dominated the innovation
process, they drew heavily on federal funding support. If one is looking for a
golden age in which the private sector did most of the innovating on its own
without federal help, one has to go back to the era before World War II (Houn-
shell 1996). Nevertheless, over the last forty years, the awards indicate a dra-
matic increase in the federal government’s centrality to the innovation econo-
my. In the earlier period, U.S. industrial and technology policies were almost
entirely monopolized by the military and space programs (Alic 2007; Hooks
1990). More recently, a wide range of non-defense agencies are involved in sup-
porting private sector research and development initiatives. Key agencies now
include Commerce, Energy, NIH, Agriculture, NSF, and Homeland Security.
5. Discussion
Our data set provides evidence of three interrelated changes in the U.S.
economy over the past generation. These are the declining centrality of the
largest corporations to the innovation process in the U.S., the growing
importance of inter-organizational collaboration and small startup firms in
the innovation process, and the expanded role of public sector institutions
as both participants in and funders of the innovation process.    
It is the last of these shifts that is the most surprising since this change
coincided with the period in which market fundamentalist ideas dominated
public policy debates. But it is important to recognize how different the fed-
eral  role  is  from  models  of  centrally  planned  technological  change.  In
Chalmers  Johnson’s  (1982)  classic  account  of  the  Japanese  model  of
industrial policy, he shows how government officials, working at the Min-
istry of Trade and Industry, operated as both coordinators and financiers for
the conquest of new markets by Japanese firms. The key was that the gov-
ernment officials were implementing a shared plan that linked investments
in particular technologies with specific business strategies to win in partic-
ular markets—both domestically and internationally.   
In the U.S. case, there is no unified plan and different government agencies
engage in support for new technologies often in direct competition with
other agencies. The approach is more like Mao’s “let a hundred flowers
bloom”: the U.S. has created a decentralized network of publicly funded lab-
oratories where technologists have strong incentives to work with private
firms and find ways to turn their discoveries into commercial products. More-
over, an alphabet soup of different programs provides agencies with oppor-
tunities to fund some of these more compelling technological possibilities.
Alongside this “build it and they will come” approach, there are also tar-
geted government programs that are designed to accelerate progress across
specific technological barriers. However, these programs are also imple-20
mented in a decentralized fashion by small agencies. The model developed
by  DARPA  of  setting  technological  goals  and  working  closely  with
researchers to accelerate breakthroughs has now diffused across the fed-
eral system (Block 2008). 
But because these programs contradict the market fundamentalist ideology
that celebrates private enterprise and denigrates the public sector, they
have remained largely unknown to the public.  Journalists rarely write about
government technology initiatives; for example, The New York Times has
mentioned the SBIR program in its news coverage fewer than ten times
over the last 27 years. To be sure, Congress periodically debates the design
and funding for these programs, but reports on these discussions are rarely
covered in The Wall Street Journal or general purpose business publica-
tions. Since the programs are largely unknown, they simply do not figure in
public policy debates (Block 2008).
Ironically, the parameters of these little known state programs fit the model
of a Developmental Network State (DNS) that Sean Ó Riain (2004) elaborat-
ed in his study of the Irish government’s efforts to encourage high tech
growth in that nation (see also Breznitz 2007). Just as in Ó Riain’s case, gov-
ernment efforts are highly decentralized, rely on strengthening technological
networks that cut across the public-private divide, and require public sector
officials to play a multiplicity of roles in supporting entrepreneurial efforts.   
Recently, Whitford and Schrank (2011) have usefully conceptualized these
government programs as efforts to overcome failures that are endemic in
networked forms of economic organization. In contrast to market failures,
network failures occur when economic actors are unable to find appropri-
ate network partners who are both competent and trustworthy.  
The programs of a Developmental Network State help to stitch together
networks and work to improve and validate the competence of potential
network partners. Furthermore, the federal laboratories, industry-university
research centers sponsored by the NSF, and informal meetings sponsored
by agencies such as DARPA create “collaborative public spaces” (Lester
and Piore 2004) where network participants are able to share key ideas.
But this revised understanding of how innovation is organized in the U.S.
economy has important implications for the regime governing intellectual
property rights. The growing interdependence between private firms and
researchers at university and government laboratories make it imperative to
rethink the assumptions on which intellectual property rules rest. The old
rules rest on the old distinction between basic science and applied science.
With basic science, researchers are supposed to publish their findings so
they can be replicated and everyone understands the need for openness and21
the sharing of information. But with applied science where there are clear
commercial applications, it is simply assumed that researchers should be
able to protect the intellectual property they generate.
While the divide between basic and applied science has always been prob-
lematic (Stokes 1997), it now no longer makes any sense at all. Basic scien-
tific discoveries such as breakthroughs in molecular biology rapidly generate
commercial applications, and work on such applied problems as conquering
particular diseases routinely generate basic scientific discoveries. The grow-
ing interdependence between university and federal laboratory scientists and
private firms is a manifestation of the obsolescence of this distinction.
One response to the disappearance of this boundary is to redefine all sci-
entific inquiry as potentially having commercial applications so that all prac-
titioners are urged to establish and protect their discoveries as valuable
intellectual property. This is the direction that was signaled by the Supreme
Court in its 1980 Diamond vs. Chakrabarty decision approving a patent for
a genetically modified organism. But this path threatens the very survival of
the scientific project which is built on creating shared knowledge and pri-
oritizing publication as the key to individual scientific careers.    
The opposite and far more constructive response is to stretch the scientif-
ic norms that include the free flow of information and knowledge deep into
the realm of applied science. This could be done by making the patent sys-
tem more like it was in the U.S. in the first half of the 19
th century when
innovators had to provide a physical model of their new idea. In other
words,  patents would be limited to something holistic and close to a com-
mercial product, not on dozens of small components and processes that
were combined into a finished product. This is the approach that fits best
with our findings about the networked nature of contemporary innovation.
As we have seen, collaboration among firms is now essential to the innovation
process, but firms have to worry that collaborators might steal the valuable
intellectual property that their researchers have already produced.   The result-
ing distrust is a major source of network failure. This is precisely why the col-
laborative public spaces provided by federal and university laboratories loom so
large in our study of the R&D 100 awards. These settings provide a safe place
where scientists and engineers—including those working at private firms— can
work together with a much reduced danger that their ideas will be unfairly
appropriated by others. But shifting the patent regime to protect only holistic
designs would help encourage collaboration and reduce distrust.
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12 It would also address the huge backlog problem faced by patent offices that cannot keep up with
the rapid flow of new patent applications.22
A concrete example is helpful. One of the current technological holy grails
is the development of a new generation of lithium ion batteries that would
generate more voltage for a significantly reduced battery weight.  Drawing
on nanotechnology, many scientists are currently experimenting with dif-
ferent patterns and different materials for the key elements of this battery.
Under current patent law, there literally could be hundreds or even thou-
sands of distinct patents to cover production processes for distinct parts of
the battery. Our alternative idea is that a single patent would be granted for
a new more effective battery design that included descriptions of the novel
techniques used to reach the higher efficiencies. Other firms would have to
pay license fees if they drew heavily on that design until a new break-
through  enabled  another  quantum  leap  in  battery  effectiveness  which
could, in turn, be protected by a patent.    
6. Conclusion
The current systems of intellectual property protection were developed for
a very different innovation environment than that which currently exists. In
an era where most innovations were produced by corporate laboratories or
individual inventors, the existing patent system made sense. But since inno-
vation now occurs in collaborative networks, often linking the public and
private sectors, the existing patent system has often become a significant
barrier to scientific and technological advance. In the computer industry,
patents are widely considered to be simply a nuisance that large firms man-
age by acquiring large portfolios of patents that they use defensively when
they are accused of infringement. In the biomedical area, university-based
researchers sometimes find themselves restricted from pursuing a line of
research because some other entity has property rights in a particular organ-
ism or genetic sequence. And business firms must be constantly alert to the
danger that their collaborators might appropriate their intellectual property
and get to the patent office first.   
The situation is further complicated by the growing role of the public sec-
tor in financing much of the research that produces commercially valuable
intellectual  property.  A  study  by  Vallas,  Kleinman,  and  Biscotti  (2011)
shows that many of the highest selling biotechnology drugs were developed
with substantial research financing by the U.S. government. Pharmaceuti-
cal firms often sell these products at extremely high prices and generate
large profits, but there is no specific payback to the government for its ear-
lier contribution. This problem now exists in milder forms across much of
the economy.
All this suggests the need for serious rethinking of the current framework
for the protection of intellectual property. A new regime of knowledge gov-
ernance is necessary to recognize the important role of the public sector in23
facilitating innovation and to minimize the negative consequences on tech-
nological advance of the current restrictive regime of intellectual property
rights.  To be sure, there is still a need to protect and provide proper incen-
tives for those who help to develop innovative new products, but this could
be done within a very different set of rules from those that have been inher-
ited from the recent past.  24
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